Most traditional mythologies have equated life to
breath. Breath was considered to be something more than respiration, linked -in a
tradition that goes back to myths of Anima Mundi- to some sort of universal
life. In this context, death was the departure of such transcendental airy
entity towards fabulous scenarios of different kinds. The link of breathing and
the capacity for speech contributed for a further metaphysical development of
the physiological act of oxygenation. The Parmenidean tradition in Greece, but
especially the Aristotelian philosophy, linked life more to intelligence than
to any other physiological action. In fact, in the Metaphysics, Aristotle
declares life to be some sort of intelligence. This double link, to breathe and
to intelligence, in their transcendental or materialistic interpretations, gave
for centuries a cornerstone for the definitions of life. Even, in the practice
of modern medicine up to the 1960’s, it was the loss of the capacity to breathe
(together with the loss of blood flow) the key property for the definition of
death. The definition of death elaborated by the Academy of Medical Royal
Colleges in 2008, declares death as the irreversible loss of the capacity for
consciousness, combined with irreversible loss of the capacity to breathe.
Here, the concept consciousness
merely describes a physiological process that would be better described as a state of vigilance, opposed to sleep,
coma or anesthesia, but in any case, implies the expression of intelligence in
its more basic terms. Thus, according to this definition death is a combination
of an irreversible loss of any state (process) of vigilance and the capacity to
breathe.
Irreversibility of functional performance seems at
first a good indicator for death, especially irreversible loss of critical
systems which lead to a general collapse of the body, like it used to be the
loss of capacity to breathe or to pump blood. However, the invention of
mechanical ventilators during the 1960’s changed the conceptual scene and
patients with massive brain destruction could maintain with the help of
machines a relatively healthy functioning of other systems. David Cole has
convincingly argued that irreversibility
is not an absolute concept in relation to the medical definition of death, for
it is conditioned both by the state of the medical technology and by the
scenarios where the death situation may occur (it is not the same a massive
heart attack in a hospital that in a camping in the mountains). If we consider
the changes in medical science, we may induce that what today is not
irreversible may be reversed tomorrow, so it seems futile to try to give final
definitions and limits for such a dynamical field of knowledge in which
biomachines may alter radically the way we look today to the functioning of
human organs.
All that is needed is a working definition which can
be used in the context of the main legal and ethical frames (Human Rights Declaration,
etc.) to avoid abuses and violations of human rights. The common ground for
ethics and medicine is not the performance of a particular organ or a system of
them, but the social persona. Therefore, irreversibility has to be measured in
relation to that persona, and in many cases it means that there are
irreversible loses even in situations when no major organs have been affected
but a general impairment ends with the life of the patient as s/he knew it. This
problem would need to be addressed and complemented in relation to the questions of assisted
suicide and the property which the individual has over his or her body. Since
human beings are symbolical, the symbolical emergent dimension has to be added
to the physiological one. The symbolical approach can be so different as the
materialistic one of physiology in relation to the transcendental one which
speaks about resurrections. In fact, the discrepancies affect to the social
persona, for while science speaks of the persona in terms of the political
legal system in which it is developed, religion speaks of a transcendental
persona beyond the political one. How to harmonize such a complex symbolical
scenario? One possible solution is a plain appeal to consistency of action:
medicine treats the socio-political persona according to the general legal
frames, while leaves the metaphysical person as a private question of the
patient. But this implies that religion also does not interfere with the
clinical practice (beyond its conditionings in the general beliefs which are
gathered in the ethical codes of the group). A person would be clinically dead when its body functions where so
impaired as to impede any psycho-social communication. Such an assessment
needs a careful and thorough examination of each individual case and has to be
independent of considerations in relation to organ donation, unless previously
specified by the patient in actual statements and reports. We would need
databases with patient decisions in relation to different health scenarios
which could affect them.
Some References
Academy of Medical Royal Colleges [2008] A Code of Practice for the Diagnosis and
Confirmation of Death.
http://www.aomrc.org.uk/doc_view/42-a-code-of-practice-for-the-diagnosis-and-confirmation-of-death.
Bosnell, Rose and Madder, Hilary.[2011] Concepts of brain death. Surgery (Oxford). Volume 29, Issue 7, July
2011, Pages 289–294.
Cole, D. J. (1993), Statutory Definitions of Death and the Management of
Terminally
Ill Patients Who May Become Organ Donors After Death, Kennedy
Institute of Ethics
Journal, 3: 145–55.
Youngner, Stuart
J. The Definition of Death. [2007] In The Oxford Handbook of Bioethics. p.p.
285-303. Oxford University Press. 2007.